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Inner Experience – Direct Access to Reality: A Complementarist Ontology and Dual Aspect Monism Support a Broader Epistemology

📄 Original study
Walach, Harald 2020 Current Era overview

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Plain English Summary

What if science has been looking at reality with one eye closed? Walach argues modern science drastically narrowed its toolkit — we once valued both inner contemplative and outer sensory experience, but materialism threw out the inner half. The problem? Materialism still cannot explain consciousness itself. Then there are psi phenomena (telepathy, precognition, psychokinesis) that keep showing statistical support in meta-analyses (big reviews combining many studies) yet completely defy materialist assumptions. Walach proposes "dual-aspect monism" — mind and matter as two faces of one deeper reality. Inspired by Bohr and the Pauli-Jung "unified world" concept, this framework legitimizes both lab science and trained contemplative practice as ways of knowing. The bold payoff: scientists should learn meditation and explore inner experience alongside brain scans, potentially accessing deep structures of reality.

Actual Paper Abstract

Ontology, the ideas we have about the nature of reality, and epistemology, our concepts about how to gain knowledge about the world, are interdependent. Currently, the dominant ontology in science is a materialist model, and associated with it an empiricist epistemology. Historically speaking, there was a more comprehensive notion at the cradle of modern science in the middle ages. Then "experience" meant both inner, or first person, and outer, or third person, experience. With the historical development, experience has come to mean only sense experience of outer reality. This has become associated with the ontology that matter is the most important substance in the universe, everything else—consciousness, mind, values, etc., —being derived thereof or reducible to it. This ontology is insufficient to explain the phenomena we are living with—consciousness, as a precondition of this idea, or anomalous cognitions. These have a robust empirical grounding, although we do not understand them sufficiently. The phenomenology, though, demands some sort of non-local model of the world and one in which consciousness is not derivative of, but coprimary with matter. I propose such a complementarist dual aspect model of consciousness and brain, or mind and matter. This then also entails a different epistemology. For if consciousness is coprimary with matter, then we can also use a deeper exploration of consciousness as happens in contemplative practice to reach an understanding of the deep structure of the world, for instance in mathematical or theoretical intuition, and perhaps also in other areas such as in ethics. This would entail a kind of contemplative science that would also complement our current experiential mode that is exclusively directed to the outside aspect of our world. Such an epistemology might help us with various issues, such as good theoretical and other intuitions.

Research Notes

Foundational theory paper for the library's philosophical framework. Provides ontological justification for taking psi phenomena seriously by arguing materialism fails to explain consciousness itself. Synthesizes philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, and parapsychology meta-analyses. Important for Controversy 10 (meta-debate about psi research validity). Cited by Tressoldi's umbrella review. Walach is a prominent figure in parapsychology and has published extensively on generalized quantum theory approaches to psi (walach_2014_parapsychological phenomena — not in catalog).

This theoretical paper argues for a complementarist dual-aspect monism ontology where consciousness and matter are coprimary aspects of an underlying reality, not reducible to either. Walach traces how 'experience' historically narrowed from Roger Bacon's bimodal conception (inner spiritual and outer sense experience) to modern empiricism's exclusive outer focus. The materialist ontology cannot explain consciousness itself or anomalous cognition (telepathy, precognition, psychokinesis), which have robust meta-analytic support but defy locality assumptions. A complementarist model (inspired by Bohr, Pauli-Jung unus mundus) permits epistemological access through both outer sense experience and inner contemplative experience. The paper proposes 'contemplative science' where scientists trained in contemplative practices systematically explore inner experience as complementary to third-person neuroscience, potentially accessing deep reality structures including mathematical intuition and ethical values.

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📋 Cite this paper
APA
Walach, Harald (2020). Inner Experience – Direct Access to Reality: A Complementarist Ontology and Dual Aspect Monism Support a Broader Epistemology. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00640
BibTeX
@article{walach_2020_inner_experience,
  title = {Inner Experience – Direct Access to Reality: A Complementarist Ontology and Dual Aspect Monism Support a Broader Epistemology},
  author = {Walach, Harald},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00640},
}