What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models
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Plain English Summary
What if your mind isn't just your brain doing fancy chemistry? This wide-ranging review rounds up evidence from six areas that challenge the standard "consciousness is produced by the brain" view. Telepathy experiments show people guessing correctly 31% of the time when chance says 25% — across thousands of trials. Even wilder, studies find your body reacts to surprising images seconds before you actually see them, as if you're peeking into the near future. Then there's terminal lucidity, where dementia patients who haven't spoken coherently in years suddenly become completely clear right before death — happening in over 80% of documented cases, which is frankly astonishing. The authors compare brain-based theories of consciousness against alternatives suggesting consciousness might be something fundamental woven into reality itself, not just an accidental byproduct of neurons firing. It's a bold challenge to the mainstream view and a useful roadmap for anyone wondering why psi research keeps turning up statistically significant results that conventional science struggles to explain.
Abstract
The nature of consciousness is considered one of science's most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today's neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term "the hard problem" to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these "non-local" properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness.
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📋 Cite this paper
Wahbeh, Helané, Radin, Dean, Cannard, Cedric, Delorme, Arnaud (2022). What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594
@article{wahbeh_2022_consciousness_not_emergent,
title = {What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models},
author = {Wahbeh, Helané and Radin, Dean and Cannard, Cedric and Delorme, Arnaud},
year = {2022},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594},
}